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Summary
Manipulation of a mechanism by the principal himself is
an issue in a context where there is no grand-mechanism
linking the principal and his agents who are instead tied to-
gether by a set of bilateral contracts. Taking into account the
possibility of manipulations and focusing on mechanisms
which are robust to such manipulations restores continuity
of the optimal mechanism with respect to the information
structure and goes in the direction of modelling weaker in-
stitutions than currently assumed in the mechanism design
literature. We present an overview of our ongoing research
on the subject and highlight some promising applications.
Résumé
Nous étudions la manipulation des mécanismes incitatifs
par le principal lui-même dans un contexte où, d’une part,
il n’est pas possible de signer un grand contrat liant ce prin-
cipal à l’ensemble de ses agents simultanément et, d’autre
part, seuls des contrats bilatéraux sont possibles. Prendre en
compte cette possibilité de manipulations et se concentrer
sur les mécanismes robustes à de telles manipulations per-
met de rétablir la continuité des mécanismes optimaux par
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rapport à la structure d’information. Cette approche contri-
bue aussi au développement de la modélisation d’institutions
plus faibles que celles retenant généralement l’attention dans
la littérature. Nous présentons un survol de quelques-uns
des résultats de notre programme de recherche sur ce thème.
Keywords: Mechanism Design, Manipulation, Bilateral contract-
ing.
Mots clés : Mécanismes incitatifs, manipulations, contrats bi-
latéraux.
J.E.L. : D82
1. Introduction
Earlier on Samuelson (1954) showed that Pareto optimal allocations could be
decentralized in a public good context by means of personalized Lindahl prices.
It was soon recognized even by Samuelson himself that the agents’ private infor-
mation on their preferences for the public good would be a major impediment
to this market solution to the public good problem. Lindahl prices could be ma-
nipulated by privately informed agents adopting a strategic behavior. Following
the seminal works of Clarke (1971), Groves (1973) and Green and Laffont (1979),
economic theory turned thus to the design of more complex incentive compatible
mechanisms which would be robust to manipulations of preferences by privately
informed agents. Through such mechanisms, privately informed agents communi-
cate the intensity of their preferences to an uninformed planner who, in response,
specifies what should be the agents’ payments and the amount of public good
produced. Of course, the basic tenet of this literature has been to assume that the
government who proposes and implements the mechanism is endowed with some
strong commitment power since he is able to bring to the contracting table all his
agents within a grand-mechanism to which all abide. The Theory of Mechanism
Design was born.
This theory is traditionally concerned with the problem of manipulation of
the choice rule by different parties involved in a contract. The manipulation
opportunities have basically two sources. First, parties which are initially endowed
with some private information may use it strategically to distort the outcome to
their benefit. Second, parties can use for the same purpose the information they
have learned in the course of the mechanism.
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Much of the mechanism design literature abstracts from the second possibility
by making strong assumptions about the commitment power of the principal and
the public nature of communication. Nevertheless, a tiny literature studies the
second possibility by focusing on posterior implementability (see Green and Laffont,
1987) or ex post implementation (see Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000 ; Bergemann and
Morris, 2005, and Jehiel et al., 2006). The underlying idea in these papers is that a
mechanism should induce strategies that are best-responses even after agents have
learned information in the course of playing the mechanism.
In our study of non-manipulable mechanisms starting with Dequiedt and
Martimort (2007a), we are also concerned by the two sources of manipulation
opportunities but open the second for the principal only. To do so, we depart
from standard mechanism design by assuming that there is no grand-mechanism
linking the principal with his agents. Instead, the principal is linked with his agents
through a set of bilateral contracts. What an agent privately communicates to the
principal in any such relationship can be used then by the principal himself to
manipulate other relationships. In that sense, our theory goes in the direction of
modelling mechanism design issues in a star network as network theorists would
say (see Jackson, 2005).
In much bilateral contracting settings with an uninformed principal, there
is some scope to use the information privately held by a given agent to affect
the contracts of others. This may be the case because there exist informational
externalities between agents (their types are correlated for instance) or production
externalities (like in a team context or in an auction environment). Each bilateral
contract between the principal and each of his agent should thus allow for the
possibility to use what the principal has learned from other agents to determine the
final allocation. With bilateral contracting, each agent is unable to check whether
his own report to the principal fits with what the principal himself reports to
other agents. This opens the possibility of opportunistic behavior by the principal
himself. Taking into account the possibility of that opportunistic behavior of the
principal imposes additional non-manipulability constraints on the allocations that
can be implemented.
Introducing those constraints buys us two important results. First, it simplifies
significantly mechanisms and optimal institutions. In various environments with
different degrees of complexity, simple nonlinear prices, the so-called “sell-out"
contracts (or some generalizations of them) are actually optimal. Intuitively, when
the principal’s opportunism is an issue, a prior commitment to a contract which
makes the principal indifferent between the various choices he may leave ex post
to an agent helps since it is robust to any ex post manipulation that the principal
could entertain. This does not mean that contracts are silent on most contingencies
because these non-manipulability constraints still leave ample room for screening
private information held by agents on the periphery of the organization. From
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an ex ante viewpoint, the principal is of course not indifferent between all possible
outputs and output distortions can be used to extract the agents’ information rents.
Second, introducing the non-manipulability of the mechanism answers what
can be seen as the most important puzzle of Incentive Theory: The fact that
information, when (even slightly) correlated between agents of the organization,
can be extracted at no cost by the principal (Crémer and McLean, 1988 among
others) whereas, in the case of independent types, optimal mechanisms reach a
genuine trade-off between rent extraction and efficiency (Myerson, 1981) which is
much in lines with the intuition developed for the principal-single agent model
(see Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Taking into account the non-manipulability
of the mechanism restores continuity with respect to the information structure
for the players’ payoffs but also for the optimal mechanism which implements
the second-best outcome. Still, this assumption maintains correlation as a means
to better (but not fully) extract the agents’ information rent. This gives a more
realistic picture of mechanism design in multi-agents environments.
Section 2 characterizes the set of non-manipulable mechanisms by means of
both a Revelation and a Taxation Principles. Section 3 shows how this charac-
terization is useful in contexts where agents work on independent projects for
the principal and where the only externality between them is an informational
one. Section 4 surveys the results obtained when applying the concept of non-
manipulability to auctions. Section 5 explores public good settings. Section 6
concludes.
2. Non-Manipulability
The first step of the analysis of non-manipulable mechanisms consists in
studying the perfect Bayesian equilibria of a multi-stage game where a principal
offers a mechanism to the agents of his organization (actually a set of bilateral
contracts), exchanges private messages with them and then chooses to publicize
the report from one agent to others. To characterize such allocations, we need to
rely on some version of the Revelation Principle which adds non-manipulability
constraints on the principal’s side to the usual characterization of the set of
incentive feasible allocations.
In private value settings, i.e., when an agent’s information (characterized by
a preference or technological parameter θi) does not directly enter in the utility
function of the principal, truthful revelation of agents’ private information does not
directly interact with manipulations by the principal. In Dequiedt and Martimort
(2007a), we adapt the standard revelation principle to show:
no 18-19 - 2006 / 1-2
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Proposition 2.1 – The Revelation Principle with Bilateral Contracting.
Dequiedt and Martimort (2007a): Any allocation achieved at a continuation
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of any arbitrary mechanism with bilateral contracting
can also be implemented as a truthful and non-manipulable continuation PBE of a
direct mechanism.
Therefore considering private communication within each bilateral contract
linking an agent with the principal simply adds a set of non-manipulability
constraints on top of the usual Bayesian incentive compatibility and participation
constraints. These additional constraints completely describe how manipulation
opportunities by the principal restricts the set of implementable choice rules.
The possibility of manipulating the reported messages has a counterpart in
terms of manipulation of the physical variables available for contracting. To get a
better understanding of non-manipulability requirements, it is useful to reformulate
the problem in terms of a modified common agency game. Such a game highlights
the bilateral nature of contracting and the extent of the principal’s opportunism in
such an environment.
Let us describe the timing of that game. At date t = 1 the principal offers a
menu of nonlinear prices {Ti(qi,θi)} to each agent of his organization. At date
t = 2, each agent picks one nonlinear price within the menu and reveals thereby
his type to the principal. Finally, at date t = 3 the principal chooses the vector of
quantities to be implemented once informed about the agents’ types by observing
their reports. An equilibrium of such a game is truthful if a θˆi-agent chooses the
nonlinear price Ti(qi, θˆi) corresponding to his type at date t = 2. Still in the case of
private values, we can show:
Proposition 2.2 – The Taxation Principle.
Dequiedt and Martimort (2007a): Any allocation achieved at a continuation
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of any arbitrary mechanism with private communica-
tion can also be implemented as a truthful continuation PBE of a modified common
agency game.
This formulation highlights the scope for the principal’s opportunism. Here the
principal cannot commit ex ante to a given quantity schedule but only to nonlinear
prices and will choose how much activities he requests from each agent ex post.
However, the departure from standard mechanism design theory is rather minimal
and only half-way that made in the common agency models. Contrary to those
common agency models, we let here the party at the node of all the contracts
play first. This extra step allows to replace the complexity of looking at complex
Nash equilibria in contracts by the more natural and simple tools of optimization.
This simplifies significantly the analysis and gets rid of the multiplicity problem
that arises in those common agency games still capturing much of the economic
économiepublique
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content from assuming opportunistic behavior of the party at the nexus of all
contracts.
Let us quickly provide two examples which give some flavor of the research
program opened when considering the non-manipulability of a mechanism.
Example 1: Vickrey auction: The Taxation Principle can be used to get a
first insight on non-manipulability. Consider the allocation of a single unit of
an indivisible private good. The Vickrey auction allocates the good to the agent
with the highest valuation and implements a monetary transfer equals to the
second-highest valuation. It is straightforward to see that in this case, the Vickrey
mechanism cannot be expressed in terms of a modified common agency game
because agents do not pay according to a nonlinear price schedule. What an agent
pays for the good is not a constant but depends on what the other agents claim.
Therefore, we can immediately conclude that the Vickrey auction is manipulable
by the principal. Trivially, a principal learning the report of an agent on his
preferences through a bilateral relationship may want to say that the losing bid
was just below to optimize the winner’s payment. A contrario, the first-price
auction is non-manipulable although it is generally not optimal beyond the case
of independent types.
Example 2: Myerson’s optimal auction: The impact of non-manipulability
is important in cases private information is correlated. Consider for instance the
optimal auction studied in Myerson (1981), Section 7. In Myerson’s example, two
bidders have private valuations in {10,100} with Pr(10,10) = Pr(100,100) = 1
3
, and
Pr(100,10) = Pr(10,100) = 1
6
. With full commitment of the seller, it is possible to
design an auction that extracts all the surplus from the bidders in a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium by implementing the transfers t (from the bidders to the seller) and
allocation rule q defined by
t(100,100) = (50,50), q(100,100) = ( 1
2
, 1
2
),
t(100,10) = (100,30), q(100,10) = (1,0),
t(10,100) = (30,100), q(10,100) = (0,1),
t(10,10) = (–10,–10), q(10,10) = ( 1
2
, 1
2
).
This auction is easily manipulable by the principal if the agents are linked through
bilateral contracts and de facto do not observe each other bids. Indeed, after a
bidder has announced 10, it is in the seller’s interest to pretend that the other
bidder has announced 100 and reap the corresponding payment.
3. Separable Projects
Let us briefly describe our set-up. We consider an organization made of one
principal (P) and 2 agents (Ai for i = 1,2). Agent Ai produces a good in quantity
no 18-19 - 2006 / 1-2
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qi on the principal’s behalf. The vector of goods (resp. transfers) is denoted by
q = (q1,q2) (resp. t = (t1, t2)). Players have quasi-linear utility functions defined
respectively as:
V (q, t) =
n∑
i=1
S(qi) – ti and Ui(q, t) = ti – θiqi.
The principal’s surplus function S˜(·) is separable:
S˜(q1,q2) =
2∑
i=1
S(qi).
for some S(·) increasing and concave in qi. The vector of goods q (resp. transfers t)
belongs to some set Q =Π2
i=1
Qi ⊂R
2
+ (resp. T =Π
2
i=1
Ti ⊂R
2).
The efficiency parameter θi is Ai’s private information. It belongs to a set
Θ = [θ, θ¯]. A vector of types is denoted θ = (θ1,θ2). Types are jointly drawn from
the common knowledge non-negative and atomless density function f˜ (θ) whose
support is Θn. For future reference, we will also denote the marginal density and
the corresponding cumulative distribution respectively as:
f (θi) =
∫
Θ
f˜ (θi,θ–i)dθ–i and F(θi) =
∫ θi
θ
f (θi)dθi.
A direct revelation mechanism is of the form {ti(θi,θ–i)}i=1,2. The implementation
concept between the agents may be Bayesian or dominant strategy as specified at
the outset by the modeler. In this section, we will focus on the case of Bayesian
implementation.
Written in terms of direct mechanisms, the non-manipulability constraint tells
us that the principal’s payoff from contracting with an agent should not depend
on what he may have learned from the other through private communication. This
gives the existence of an arbitrary function hi(θi) such that:
S(qi(θi,θ–i)) – ti(θi,θ–i) = hi(θi) (1)
Equation (1) shows that each agent is made residual claimant for the part of the
principal’s objective function which is directly related to his own output. The
nonlinear price which achieves this objective is a sell-out contract:
Ti(qi,θi) = S(qi) –hi(θi). (2)
Everything happens thus as if agent Ai had to pay upfront an amount hi(θi) to
produce on the principal’s behalf. Then, the agent enjoys all returns S(q) on the
project he is running for the principal. The principal’s payoff in his relationship
with Ai is hi(θi) and this payoff does not depend on the amount produced. Of
course, fixed-fees are adapted so that participation by all types is ensured.
économiepublique
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Such mechanisms form a strict subset of the set of incentive feasible mech-
anisms which puts much structure on optimal contracting. As a result the full
extraction of the agents’ information rent is no longer feasible in correlated
environments and we get:
Proposition 3.1 – Dequiedt and Martimort (2007a): Assume that the general-
ized virtual marginal costs defined as
ϕ(θi,θ–i) = θi +
F(θi)
f (θi)
1+
f˜θi (θ–i |θi)
f˜ (θ–i |θi)
F(θi)
f (θi)
are always non-negative, strictly increasing in θi and decreasing in θ–i and that
the correlation is weak enough. Then, the optimal non-manipulable Bayesian
mechanism entails a downward output distortion qSB(θi,θ–i) which satisfies the
following “modified Baron-Myerson” formula
S′(qSB(θ)) = ϕ(θi,θ–i), (3)
and agents always get a positive rent except for the least efficient ones.
With independent types, the principal finds useless the report of one agent
to better design the other’s incentives. He must give up some information rent
to induce information revelation anyway. Outputs are accordingly distorted
downward to reduce those rents and the standard Baron-Myerson distortions
follow:
S′(qSB(θ)) = θi +
F(θi)
f (θi)
. (4)
The important point to notice is that the optimal multilateral contract with unrelated
projects and independent types can be implemented with a pair of bilateral contracts
which are de facto non-manipulable by the principal. The non-manipulability
constraints have no bite in this case.
When types are instead correlated, the agents’ rent can be (almost) fully
extracted in this context with a continuum of types and the first-best output can be
implemented at no cost if communication is public. Those schemes are manipulable
and no longer used with private communication.
To understand the nature of the output distortions and the role of the correlation,
it is useful to compare the solution found in (3) with the optimal mechanism had
the principal contracted separately with each agent. By using correlation, the
optimal contract reduces the agent’s information rent. When the agents’ types
are positively correlated, learning from agent A1 that his cost parameter is high
enough is relatively good news on agent A2 since it indicates that the latter is
unlikely to have cheated on his type. There is less need to distort A2’s output for
rent extraction reasons and the output given by (3) is above the Baron-Myerson
solution (4). The reverse happens in case of bad news.
no 18-19 - 2006 / 1-2
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Opportunism on the principal’s side restore a genuine trade-off between rent
extraction and efficiency. As a matter of fact, the optimal non-manipulable mech-
anism corresponds to a set of bilateral sell-out contract whatever the correlation
structures between the agents’ types.
Proposition 3.2 – Dequiedt and Martimort (2007a): The optimal non-
manipulable Bayesian mechanism is implemented through sell-out contracts what-
ever the level of correlation between the agents’ types. Payoffs of the principal and
the agents are continuous in the level of this correlation.
4. Auctions
As suggested by Examples 1 and 2 above, the study of non-manipulable
auctions offers an important application of our theory. On the theoretical hand, non-
manipulability restores continuity of the optimal Bayesian incentive compatible
auction with respect to the information structure and therefore evacuates the major
cause of scepticism by auction theorists about the mechanism design methodology
(see Milgrom, 2004, for instance). On the practical hand, assuming bilateral
contracting and private communication between the seller and each of his bidders
is certainly a convenient hypothesis to study auctions organized on the internet.
The modified common agency formulation gives an active role to the seller and is
also a consistent way to introduce shill bidding phenomena in a mechanism design
framework.
In Dequiedt and Martimort (2007b), we provide a first attempt to analyze
non-manipulable auctions. The setting is now characterized by utility functions
defined for the principal and the agents respectively as:
V (q, t) =
n∑
i=1
ti and Ui(q, t) = θiqi – ti.
Even if Example 1 suggested that imposing non-manipulability may have a strong
impact on what can be achieved by the principal, we first obtain an equivalence
result for the case of independently distributed private information.
Proposition 4.1 – Dequiedt and Martimort (2007b): Non-manipulability
constraints have no impact on the profit that can be obtained by the seller when
agents’ private information is independently distributed.
Indeed, the first-price auction is easily seen to be non-manipulable by the
principal and achieves (from the Revenue Equivalence Theorem) the highest possible
profit for the seller.
économiepublique
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However, as soon as private information is correlated, non-manipulability
restricts the profit that can be achieved. By the same token, the first price auction
is no longer optimal.
Compared to the case of unrelated projects, the analysis is made more complex
here because the non-manipulability constraints are not easily separable in the
agents’ identity. Therefore some preliminary steps are necessary before it is possible
to solve the principal’s maximization problem. Provided the agents’ valuations
are affiliated and the implemented quantity schedule obtained by one agent is
decreasing in the valuation of the other agents we can prove that the expected rent
left to the agents is minimal when the mechanism offered by the principal is an
all-pay auction with a type dependent entry-fee. With such an auction, the agents
pay an entry Ti(qi,θi) = h(θi) independent on whether he wins or not the auction;
the winning agent being the one who pays the highest entry fee.
Once this step is performed, we can separate again the non-manipulability
constraints as in equation (1) and the analysis of the rent-efficiency trade-off
is much similar to that in the independent projects case. It is possible to derive
the generalized virtual valuations that drive the determination of the optimal
allocation. Correlation implies that even if we start from a purely private value
setting in which each agent’s valuation depends on his own private information
only, the generalized virtual valuations are interdependent, they take into account
an indirect informational externality. One consequence of this feature is that it
is generally impossible for the principal to implement the optimal auction with
a deterministic reserve price. Instead, the decision of the seller to allocate the
good to the winning bidder or to keep it is driven by the whole array of bids. The
reserve price is therefore stochastic as it depends on the bids of others. Deriving
the optimal auction, we can prove:
Proposition 4.2 – Dequiedt and Martimort (2007b): The optimal non-
manipulable auction can be implemented via an all-pay auction with secret (and
stochastic) reserve price.
5. Public Good Mechanisms
Let us consider the scope for manipulability of public good mechanisms. This
new assumption aims at modelling weaker institutions for the provision of public
goods than what has generally been assumed. In particular, it relies on the fact
that governments have a limited commitment ability, an issue of much practical
importance in a public good context but which has received little attention so far.
Whereas in the case of auctions investigated in Section 4, there is little ambi-
guity in the objective of the seller, things are somewhat different for public good
no 18-19 - 2006 / 1-2
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provision. Indeed, the behavior of the government acting as the principal designing
the mechanism depends on his objective function. Planners may be benevolent,
may have redistributive concerns either postulated at the outset 1 or may act as
Leviathan. In each case, the non-manipulability of the mechanism puts different
kinds of constraints on the principal.
Indeed, the non-manipulability constraints take different forms depending on
the exact nature of the government’s objective. A benevolent planner chooses
output ex post to maximize the sum of the agents’ utilities. A Leviathan would
instead act opportunistically to maximize the profits he may withdraw from
producing the public good on the agents’ behalf.
To fix ideas, consider a two-agent economy. Agent Ai has a constant marginal
valuation for the public good which is denoted by θi. Incorporating the cost of the
public good into the agents’ utility functions, agent Ai’s utility function can be
written as:
Ui = v(θi,q) – ti where v(θi,q) = θiq–
q2
2
.
In such environment, it is straightforward to check that the first-best output
satisfying the Lindahl-Samuelson condition is:
q∗(θ1,θ2) =
1
2
(θ1 + θ2).
Consider now a dominant strategy (or Clarke-Groves) mechanism {ti(θi,θ–i)}i=1,2.
Such mechanism satisfies the following dominant strategy incentive compatibility:
∂ti
∂θi
(θi,θ–i) = (θi –q
∗(θi,θ–i))
∂q∗
i
∂θi
(θi,θ–i).
Therefore, we get by integration:
ti(θi,θ–i) =
θ2
i
8
–
θiθ–i
4
– g(θ–i)
for some g(·) function. In terms of nonlinear prices, and using θ–i = 2q–θi to replace
into the previous formula, these transfers can be written as:
Ti(θi,q) =
3θ2
i
8
–
θiq
2
–g(2q– θi).
Consider now the problem of a benevolent but opportunistic principal. First, this
principal offers such menus to the agents and let them pick a particular item in
those menus. From the dominant strategy requirement, this choice is incentive
compatible:
θi ∈ argmax
θˆi
v(θi,q
∗(θˆi,θ–i)) –Ti(θi,q
∗(θˆi,θ–i)).
1. Ledyard and Palfrey (1999).
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Once informed on the agents’ preferences by this first stage of the game, the
principal chooses ex post the amount of public good q(θ1,θ2) so that:
q(θ1,θ2) = argmax
q
2∑
i=1
v(θi,q) –Ti(θi,q).
Restricting to g(·) differentiable and concave in q, this yields the following first-
order condition:
q∗(θ1,θ2) – 2q(θ1,θ2) = 2

2∑
i=1
g′(2q(θ1,θ2) – θi)
 . (5)
The Clarke-Groves mechanism is non-manipulable by the principal if and only if
q∗(θ1,θ2) = q(θ1,θ2) solves (5). This yields that necessarily
2∑
i=1
g′(θi) = –
2∑
i=1
θi
4
and
g(θi) = –
θ2
i
8
+k
where k is some constant. We can thus state:
Proposition 5.1 – Up to some constant, there exists a unique Clarke-Groves
mechanism which is non-manipulable.
This result might be contrasted with example 1 which deals with a single unit
auction and establishes that the Vickrey auction is manipulable. In a different
context, non-manipulable Clarke-Groves mechanisms might still exist.
6. Conclusion
Non-manipulability can be interpreted as incentive compatibility on the princi-
pal’s side. It is a notion that is consistent with relaxing the commitment hypothesis
made in standard mechanism design theory and is justified by a simple hypothesis
of bilateral contracting and private communication between the principal and
each of his agents. Beyond the fact that non-manipulability constraints restore
continuity of the optimal Bayesian mechanism with respect to the information
structure, it is possible to reconsider the entire theory of incentives by adding such
constraints to obtain more satisfactory mechanisms closer to real-world institutions.
We believe that such a reconsidered theory can be useful to understand a wide
range of phenomena like auctions on the internet, the provision of local public
no 18-19 - 2006 / 1-2
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goods or intermediated trading institutions. Much work remains to be done and
we hope this overview will become rapidly obsolete.
References
Bergemann, D. and S. Morris. 2005. “Robust Mechanism Design”, Econometrica,
73, 1771-1814.
Clarke, E. 1971. “Multipart Pricing of Public Goods”, Public Choice, 2:19-33.
Crémer, J., and R. McLean. 1988. “Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and
Dominant Strategy Auctions”, Econometrica , 56, 1247-1257.
Dasgupta, P. and E. Maskin. 2000. “Efficient Auctions”, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 115, 341-388.
Dequiedt, V. and D. Martimort. 2007a. “Mechanism Design with Bilateral Contract-
ing”, mimeo, University of Toulouse.
Dequiedt, V. and D. Martimort. 2007b. “Non-Manipulable Auctions”, mimeo,
University of Toulouse.
Green, J., and J.J. Laffont. 1979. Incentives in Public Decision-Making. North
Holland.
Green, J. and J.-J. Laffont. 1987. “Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person
Decision Problem”, Econometrica, 55(1): 69-94.
Groves, T. 1973. “Incentives in Teams”, Econometrica, 41: 617-631.
Jackson, M. 2005. “The Economics of Social Networks”, to appear in Advances
in Economic Theory, Proceedings of the 2005 World Congress of the Econometric
Society.
Jehiel, P., M. Meyer-Ter-Vehn, B. Moldovanu, and W. Zame. 2006. “The Limits of
Ex-Post Implementation”, Econometrica, 74, 585-610.
Laffont, J.-J. and D. Martimort. 2000. “Mechanism Design with Collusion and
Correlation”, Econometrica, 68, 309-342.
Laffont, J.-J. and D. Martimort. 2002. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-
Agent Model, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ledyard, J. and T. Palfrey. 1999. “A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with
Public Goods”, Econometrica, 67: 435-448.
économiepublique
15
dossier Vianney Dequiedt, David Martimort
Martimort, D. 2005. “Multicontracting Mechanism Design”, to appear in Advances
in Economic Theory, Proceedings of the 2005 World Congress of the Econometric
Society.
Milgrom, P. 2004. Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press.
Myerson, R. 1981. “Optimal Auction Design”, Mathematics of Operations Research,
6(1): 58-73.
Samuelson, P. 1954. “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure”, Review of Economics
and Statistics, 36: 387-389.
no 18-19 - 2006 / 1-2
16
